To stream or not to stream

A response to ESA still seems shy about sharing news on Ariane 6 rocket testing

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To stream or not to stream

ESA - M. Pédoussaut

Last week, Ars Technica reporter Stephen Clark published an article entitled ESA still seems shy about sharing news on Ariane 6 rocket testing. Although Clark does touch on some important issues of transparency, he also struggles to reckon with the complexities of ESA.

Now, let me state for the record that I have a huge amount of respect for Clark. He has a long and distinguished career and has done some incredible work. The intricacies of the European Space Agency (ESA) and its member states are, however, not easy to navigate. It’s complicated enough just to get people to understand the difference between ArianeGroup and Arianespace. Then you have to grapple with the complex relationships between industry and ESA and the member states that define and fund its mission.

Points of contention

I hadn’t initially intended to go point by point in response to the article, but there are a few items mentioned that I do think are in desperate need of additional context.

A delayed start - In reference to a 26-hour countdown rehearsal for Ariane 6 that was performed on 18 June, Clark notes that it had initially been scheduled to take place on 13 June. He also notes the absence of this detail from the official announcement of the testing published on July 25 and utilizes this omission as an additional example of the agency’s lack of transparency around the development of Ariane 6. I also thought that this was an interesting omission. However, I don’t see why this isn’t a detail that he himself couldn’t have asked ESA directly about. I was curious, so I did take the time to send an email asking about it.

“The test planned on 13 July had to be postponed due to a leak in a flange seal of a flexible hose between the mobile hydrogen reservoir and the Ariane 6 cryogenic infrastructure,” an ESA spokesperson told European Spaceflight. “This leak was detected before the cooling down of the cryogenic infrastructure (liquid oxygen and hydrogen lines) necessary for the filling of the tanks of Ariane 6 to start. Consequently, the filling test could not even begin. The leak was fixed, and the test was thus moved to 18 July.” 

It would have been useful to know in that original update, but it doesn’t really appear that ESA is shy about talking about it, does it?

A second point related to the countdown rehearsal that Clark identifies as proof of a lack of transparency is the fact that the agency took a week to announce the outcome of the testing. To put this into context, the team came off a 26-hour shift and then had to analyze the results and prepare those results for review. Each of the Ariane 6 Task Force partners (ESA, CNES, Arianespace, ArianeGroup) then had to review the text before it was released. Achieving all that in a week really doesn’t seem all that ridiculous to me. However, the article leaves the reason for it taking a week open, allowing the reader to fill in the unmentioned but implied conspiracy.

Budgets and programme management structures - Under the subheading, You won’t get to watch the Ariane 6 hot-fire test, Clark states that “ESA not only controls the purse strings but also has the final say in releasing updates on the Ariane 6 program.” On a factual level, neither of those statements are true.

ESA does not control the purse strings. That responsibility belongs to member states. It is up to member states which programmes get approved and how much each state elects to contribute to a particular programme. The role of ESA, its Director General, and, in no small part, the office of the Inspector General is to gather and present information on programmes to allow member states to make informed decisions on how to best allocate their funding. Following a programme’s approval, the agency’s role shifts to that of execution all while being accountable to its member states.

As an example of this, I present a historical reference. In 1999, France unilaterally decided that it no longer felt compelled to fund the development of the Vega launch vehicle. This resulted in the discontinuation of the programme and a response by Italy that included pulling €80 million out of the Ariane 5 Evolution programme. Cooler heads would eventually prevail, but it proves how little control ESA has over how much is spent and what it is spent on.

It should be noted here that there are mandatory programmes that member states are required to contribute to on a scale based on their Gross National Product (GDP). However, only the general budget and the space science programme (studies on future projects, technology research, shared technical investments, information systems, and training programmes) are mandatory. Programmes like Earth observation, telecommunications, satellite navigation, and indeed space transportation are all optional.

As for the second statement of the sentence, ESA does not have the final say to release updates and information regarding the Ariane 6 programme. These decisions are made by the Ariane 6 Task Force partners, which include ESA, CNES, Arianespace, and ArianeGroup. The four need to be in unanimous agreement for information to be released. One could certainly make the argument that this system can be abused by industry, but that doesn’t change the fact that releasing information is not solely in the purview of ESA.

Whose line is it anyway - In the second to last paragraph, Clark writes that Ariane 6 being a single-use expendable launch vehicle puts it "at a disadvantage against international competitors and has led Aschbacher to write that Europe is in an "acute launcher crisis."" This, however, is at best stretched paraphrasing and at worst straight misquoting. 

The quoted section is from a piece director general Aschbacher published on LinkedIn entitled A holistic approach for launchers and exploration in Europe. The full quote is as follows: “Europe, on the other hand, finds itself today in an acute launcher crisis with a (albeit temporary) gap in its own access to space and no real launcher vision beyond 2030.” Later on in the same article, the DG states, “Once operational, I am convinced that Ariane 6 will be an excellent launcher for many years to come, continuing the performance of Ariane 5 at significantly lower cost to satisfy European and commercial needs.” It doesn’t really seem like the commercial performance of Ariane 6 is being described as a crisis by the DG.  

Clark also fails to outline the fact that there are planned upgrades to Ariane 6 already being developed and a roadmap towards utilizing the work being done for the Themis and Prometheus programmes that could allow for the implementation of partial reusability aboard the vehicle. Now, one could certainly question the overall viability of these plans and whether or not they will have a significant impact on the commercial viability of the vehicle, but to omit that information altogether ensures a skewed representation of the facts. 

The definition of transparency

While US companies and agencies have taken to streaming testing to varying degrees, Europe has historically never done so. In fact, when I asked the agency if it had ever done so in the past, an ESA representative told me “No, this sort of test has not been livestreamed in the past.”  When Clark asked ESA out of the blue whether or not it planned to with the long-duration hot fire test, the agency likely just reverted to its standard operating procedure. That doesn’t mean the agency is “shy about sharing news on Ariane 6 rocket testing.” ESA just does not have a culture of making a live sport out of testing like the US has.

I may be in the minority with this opinion, but I don’t see the streaming of the long-duration hot fire test as a key indicator of transparency. If I have access to the results, good or bad, in due time following the conclusion of the test, then I don’t see a lack of transparency. ESA has proved its transparency credentials when it comes to testing over the last year with the ill-fated Vega C saga. I do not believe that the agency needs to further prove itself in this regard. That is, however, not to say that I don’t have serious questions about ESA’s transparency.

If you are really serious about transparency around the spending of public funding, which Clark’s article purports to be, then you would want transparency around the spending, wouldn’t you? This is an issue that continues to frustrate me. I don’t want a video stream of the long-duration hot fire test. I want a detailed breakdown of how much is being spent on Ariane 6 and all other major ESA programmes and what it is being spent on.

In his article, Clark also fails to mention the nearly monthly detailed updates the agency has been publishing recently regarding the development of Ariane 6. If you’ve yet to see one, here’s the June update. The development of Ariane 6 has had many problems, but if anything, the recent updates from ESA have shown that the DG is making a concerted effort to ensure that there is as much transparency around the vehicle’s journey to the launchpad as possible. It has been a rare win for transparency. Why is this the story we’re going after?

I do, however, think it’s important to state that a live-streamed test may very well lead to a greater number of average Europeans who are not space enthusiasts engaging with the test. Without a live stream, these individuals are unlikely to have engaged with the content otherwise. So, I do concede that there is an argument to be made that it could bring a greater degree of transparency to the programme. 

Conclusion

Following the publication of Clark’s article, fellow Ars Technica reporter Eric Berger shared the article on Twitter. In response to a comment on the post, Berger wrote, “There are some good European space journalists whom I consider colleagues. Why they are not more upset about this, I cannot understand.” 

Like Clark, I have a great deal of respect for Berger. He has been an incredible supporter of my work and I have always found him willing and eager to debate and, if convinced, have his mind changed. As I do consider myself a European space journalist, I would, as a result, like to answer the question he posed in a little more detail.

I’m not upset that the live stream may or may not be streamed. Would it make for a fun news story and a good opportunity for ESA to drum up interest in its launcher programme amount those Europeans who aren’t space enthusiasts? Most definitely, yes. You’ll see no argument from me there. For that missed opportunity, I am mildly annoyed. If you want to talk about being upset, though, let’s talk about accountability.

It’s relatively uncontroversial to say that Ariane 6 has been in development hell. Last year when the maiden flight of the vehicle was pushed out yet again and this time for more than a year, ESA and the key partners of the ArianeGroup programme had a press conference. When asked what precipitated this latest delay, the group not only failed to come up with a compelling answer, but not one member of the panel took a moment to accept responsibility for the delay and apologize for plunging Europe into what the DG has himself called a “crisis.” I didn’t need heads on a spike or resignation letters typed in the Notes app. All I needed was an acknowledgment that public money was spent and promises were not kept. 

At the time, I noted that as a father of a 4-year-old, I have been grappling with how to teach my daughter to take responsibility for her actions. It is something that I see as a fundamental element of parenthood, a lesson that will serve her far better than any university degree ever will. How am I supposed to look her in the eye and ask her to own up to her mistakes when grown ups in trusted leadership positions are unable to take the 60 seconds that would be needed to do the same? 

When I asked ArianeGroup if they were willing to step up and take responsibility for the delays, I was told point blank that “Ariane 6 is an ESA program” and that they were “very surprised” at my insinuation that the company should shoulder any responsibility. That was the last time I received a response from a request for comment from ArianeGroup with the company blacklisting me following the publication of Issue 31 of the newsletter. As a European space journalist, this is what upsets me.

Following the failure of the Vega C flight for what can best be described as continued poor quality control at Avio, I discovered a line item in the company’s 2022 financial fillings that put me in a tailspin of rage. “For this purpose [the return to flight of Vega C], ESA has announced a dedicated support program for circa 30M€ (to be drawn from existing budgets already subscribed at ministerial Council of 2022) to cover the necessary costs of return to flight activities.” Instead of the company drawing from its own coffers, which according to its financials includes €131,403,014 of cash and cash equivalents, the agency drew money away from other programmes to fund the return to flight of Vega C. And that’s not to mention the egregious bonuses that Avio executive staff are receiving as the company brings in hundreds of millions in public money but struggles to bring in even mediocre profits. When I started talking about the financial and operational mismanagement of Avio in Issue 49 of the newsletter, the company followed ArianeGroup’s lead and blacklisted me. As a European space journalist, this is yet another thing that upsets me.

It saddens me to see how many have jumped on Clark’s bandwagon criticizing ESA for not streaming the long-duration test when so many actual issues of transparency exist. Last week was the kind of thing that I’ve sent the last two years trying to ensure didn’t happen. I had hoped to be a lighthouse in the night for anyone struggling to understand the complex structures of ESA and the European launcher market. It is clear that I still have my work cut out for me.